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Whatever Happened To Quick Look?
Edward D. Cavanagh*
In California Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C.1 (hereafter “Cal Dental”),
the Supreme Court observed that there is no sharp divide
separating conduct that can be summarily condemned under
section one of the Sherman Act2 as per se unlawful from conduct
that warrants a more searching factual assessment to ascertain
any anticompetitive effect and hence its legality.3 The Court
further observed that not every antitrust claim falling outside the
narrow ambit of per se illegality warrants the detailed Rule of
Reason analysis prescribed in Chicago Board of Trade.4 The
Court thereby eschewed any notion that section one analysis is
dichotomous, i.e., that restraints of trade fall into one of two
categories: per se violations, which are condemned out of hand;
or Rule of Reason violations, which are condemned only after a
detailed analysis of anticompetitive effects and procompetitive
benefits.5 Rather, it suggested that conduct be adjudged on a
sliding scale and that “the quality of proof required should vary
with the circumstances.”6
In so ruling, the Court specifically acknowledged what it had held
implicitly in three earlier decisions7: that certain conduct,
although falling outside of the narrow parameters of per se
illegality, has such anticompetitive potential that absent proof of
*

Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law.
526 U.S. 756 (1999).
2
15 U.S.C. §1.
3
Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 780–81.
4
Id.
5
Alan J. Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust
Law Should Reject the Quick Look, 104 GEO. L.J. 835, 837 (2016). (describing the “all or
nothing character” of the dichotomous approach).
6
Id.
7
See F.T.C. v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); NCAA v. Board of
Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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procompetitive justification it can be condemned after a “quick
look” without a detailed market assessment.8 Accordingly, the
Court acknowledged in principle the concept of a truncated Rule
of Reason analysis. Ultimately, however, the Court concluded that
“quick look” did not apply to the facts of the case and that a “less
quick look” was necessary to assess defendant’s advertising
restrictions because it was not intuitively obvious that these
advertising restrictions by themselves would create
anticompetitive effect and because the advertising restrictions
may have actually promoted competition by eliminating
unverifiable and misleading discount and quality of service
advertising.9
Quick look is tailor–made for restraints that bear a close family
resemblance to price–fixing10 but are of the type with which courts
have little experience or are idiosyncratic in nature.11 Proponents
of quick look argue that quick look “improves upon the traditional
dichotomous approach by reducing and enforcement and
adjudication costs, enhancing the accuracy of administrative and
judicial determinations and improving deterrence of harmful
restraints.”12 Yet, notwithstanding Cal Dental’s ruling that quick
look applies “[where] an observer with even rudimentary
understanding of economics could conclude that the
arrangements in question have anticompetitive effect on
customers and markets,”13 quick look has not caught on in the
lower courts. Indeed, with the notable exception of the D.C.
Circuit’s decision in Polygram Holding, Inc. v. F.T.C.14 (hereafter
“Three Tenors”), the lower courts appear to have largely
abandoned the quick look approach.15
This article analyzes the evolution of the Rule of Reason, the
emergence of quick look analysis, and its precipitous decline. It
8

Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 770.
Id. at 781.
10
See Polygram Holding, Inc. v. F.T.C., 416 F.3d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
11
See XI, Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law para. 1911 at 335–36
(3d ed. 2011) (hereafter “Areeda & Hovenkamp”).
12
See, Meese, supra note 5, at 881–82 (questioning the benefits of quick look analysis).
13
Cal. Dental, 526 at 720.
14
416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir.2005).
15
See Edward D. Cavanagh, The Rule of Reason Re–examined, 67 BUS. LAWYER 435,
459 (2012).
9
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argues that the traditional unstructured Rule of Reason analysis
articulated in Chicago Board of Trade is unworkable in that it is
costly, unpredictable, and has significant risks of error. This
article further argues that the structured, nuanced, fact–specific
inquiry utilized in Three Tenors would provide “more clarity,
greater predictability, fewer errors and less expense in antitrust
litigation”16 and that the lower courts should embrace—not
shun—quick look. It concludes that widespread adoption of the
quick look approach by lower courts is unlikely. In Cal Dental,
the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to clarify how the Rule
of Reason should be applied in antitrust cases. Moreover, its
decisions since Cal Dental have sent mixed signals on quick
look.17 As a result, the concept of quick look, outside a narrow
range of FTC cases, has largely become a dormant doctrine.18
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF REASON ....................................... 42
A. Chicago Board of Trade ............................................................ 42
B. Per se Rules ............................................................................... 47
C. Emergence of Quick Look .......................................................... 49
D. Do We Need Quick Look? .......................................................... 55
II. POST–CAL DENTAL RULINGS ON QUICK LOOK ................................ 56
A. Supreme Court ........................................................................... 56
B. Lower Courts ............................................................................. 58
1. FTC ...................................................................................... 58
2. Department of Justice........................................................... 63
3. Private Litigation.................................................................. 64
III. PRESUMPTIVE LEGALITY? ............................................................... 65
IV. CONCLUSION.................................................................................... 67

16

Id. at 437.
See infra notes 156–59 and accompanying text.
18
See, Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of
the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 461, 464 (2000) (“the quick look is an artifact of a
bygone Populist era in which courts and enforcement agencies protected the freedom of
traders from contractual restraints deemed ‘monopolistic’ by the applied price theory
school of industrial organization”).
17
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF REASON
A. Chicago Board of Trade
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract,
combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade.”19 Read literally,
section one would bar any contract in interstate commerce because, as the
Supreme Court has recognized, “[e]very agreement concerning trade,
every regulation of trade, restrains”; and in fact, the “very essence” of
every contract is “to restrain.”20 Congress made no effort to define the
scope of the broad section one prohibition, nor what constitutes restraints
of trade. Instead, Congress left it to the courts “to give shape to the statute’s
broad mandate.”21
In Standard Oil Co v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected the
notion that the term “every” in section one must be read literally.22 Rather,
the Court ruled that Congress had drawn the statute in light of the existing
common law of trade restraints, which prohibited only unreasonable
restraints of trade.23 Accordingly, section one bars only unreasonable
restraints of trade; and thus, the Rule of Reason was born.
Standard Oil, however, made no attempt to provide guidance on how
the Rule of Reason would be applied to the facts of a particular case. Over
a decade earlier, then–Judge Taft, writing for the Sixth Circuit in Addyston
Pipe,24 ruled that the analysis must focus on the character of the restraint
in question, not the degree.25 Addyston Pipe involved an action by the
United States to prosecute a scheme to fix the price of pipe and to allocate
sales territories among defendants.26 The defendants, focusing on the
degree of restraint, argued that the restraints in question were not
unreasonable and therefore lawful because they were not oppressive; that
is, prices were not “too high.”27 Taft rejected that approach. He noted that
at common law courts distinguished between naked restraints of trade and
ancillary restraints of trade.28 Naked restraints—those agreements that had
no purpose other than to restrain trade for the benefit of the conspirators—
were condemned out of hand by the common law courts.29 Ancillary
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

15 U.S.C. § 1.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
Nat’l Soc’y Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
221 U.S. 1, 59–60 (1911).
Id.
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
Id. at 283–84.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 284.
Addyston Pipe, 85 F.271 at 283–84.
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restraints—those restraints necessary to carry out the main purpose of the
contract—were lawful if reasonable. Price fixing among competitors was
a naked restraint and hence illegal per se; no question of reasonableness
could be entertained by courts.30
In so ruling, Judge Taft criticized those courts that have equated
reasonableness with the degree of the restraint as having “set sail on a sea
of doubt” and “assumed the power to say, in respect to contracts that have
no other purpose and no other consideration on either side than the mutual
restraint of the parties, how much restraint of competition is in the public
interest, and how much is not.”31 Taft further stated that “[t]he manifest
danger in the administration of justice according to so shifting, vague and
indeterminate a standard would seem to be a strong reason against
adopting it.”32
The Supreme Court first confronted the question of how to apply the
Rule of Reason in Chicago Board of Trade.33 There, the government
challenged as price fixing a rule adopted by the Board of Trade which
imposed a trading restriction on certain commodities by requiring buyers
to freeze their bids from the close of one trading session to the beginning
of the next, a period of some twenty hours.34 The Board of Trade argued
that the restraint was reasonable and offered evidence of purported
procompetitive benefits of its rule.35 The trial court struck from the record
of evidence purporting to justify the restraint and then condemned the rule
as unlawful on its face.36
On appeal, the Supreme Court, with Justice Brandeis writing for the
majority, reversed.37 Rejecting the per se approach, Justice Brandeis wrote
that alleged restraints under section one had to be viewed in their factual
context to determine whether they are reasonable:
But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be
determined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains
competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every
regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of
their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Id.
Id. at 284.
Id.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
Id. at 237–38.
Id. at 237.
Id.
Id. at 241.
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suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that
question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied,
its condition before and after the restraint was imposed.
The history if the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not
because a good intention will save an otherwise
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts
and to predict consequences.38
In applying these principles, Brandeis said that courts should focus on
three issues; (1) the nature of the rule; (2) the scope of the rule; and (3) the
effects of the rule.39 Brandeis ruled that a restriction on price making for
part of a trading day was not anticompetitive in nature because the Call
Rule did not prohibit trading after hours.40 The Rule only required buyers
to decide prior to the close of a trading day the price that they would be
willing to pay when trading reopened the next day.41 As to the scope of the
Rule, Brandeis emphasized that the Rule was limited to “to arrive” grain
and “applied only to a small part of the grain shipped from day to day to
Chicago” and then for only part of the day. Exchange members could buy
“to arrive” grain at any price during a trading session and could also buy
grain in other markets without any restrictions.42
Brandeis also concluded that the Call Rule had no appreciable effect
on the market prices for grain because it applied to only a small portion of
the grain shipped to Chicago daily and then for only part of the business
day and did not apply at all to grain transported to markets outside
Chicago.43 In addition to finding no appreciable anticompetitive effect,
Brandeis cited a number of procompetitive benefits in the form of
improved market conditions for to arrive grain.44 After concluding that the
procompetitive benefits outweighed any anticompetitive effects, the Court
reversed the decision below and directed judgment for the defendant.45
The decision in Chicago Board of Trade is intriguing from both a
substantive and procedural perspective. From a substantive perspective,
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
Id. at 239–40.
Id. at 239.
Id.
Id.
Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 240.
Id. at 240–241.
Id. at 241.
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the Court clearly rejected the concepts naked restraints of trade and per se
illegality suggested by Judge Taft in Addyston Pipe.46 The Court—again
contrary to Addyston Pipe—focused its analysis on the degree of the
restraint, thus setting sail on the forbidden “sea of doubt.”47
Procedurally, the decision is also baffling. Even though the trial court
had stricken from the record all evidence of the Call Rule’s supposed
procompetitive benefits, Brandeis’s opinion nonetheless cites a litany of
procompetitive benefits.48 Where did Brandeis get all of these “facts”?
They certainly did not come from the trial record. Worse, based on these
facts from outside the record, Brandeis not only reversed the judgment
below but also ordered that judgment be entered for the defendant.49
Having found that the trial had improperly excluded evidence of potential
procompetitive benefits, the Court should have remanded the case,
directed the trial court to admit evidence of procompetitive benefits, and
then have the trial court determine whether, on balance, procompetitive
benefits outweighed any anticompetitive effects.
Nevertheless, remand would not have cured the errors in the Court’s
analysis; the analytical framework proposed by Brandeis is itself
defective. The Court identifies a laundry list of factors that courts must
consider in evaluating the reasonableness of an alleged restraint.50 Yet, it
provides no indication of the importance of any one factor or what weight
to assign each factor.51 Nor does it discuss the kinds of procompetitive
benefits that are appropriately considered and weighed to offset
anticompetitive effects.52 In short, Chicago Board of Trade provides little
meaningful guidance to courts in assessing alleged restraints of trade. In a
stinging rebuke, Judge, then–Professor, Easterbrook characterizes the
Brandeis formulation as “empty.”53
If the economist has a way to approach new practices, a
judge today has none. According to the Supreme Court,
“[T]he inquiry mandated by the Rule of Reason is whether
the challenged agreements is one that promotes
competition or one that suppresses competition . . . .
[T]he purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about
46

Addyston Pipe, 85 F.271 at 283–84.
Id. at 284.
48
Chicago Board of Trade, 246 U.S. at 240–41.
49
Id. at 241.
50
Id. at 238.
51
Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 11, para.1502 at 389.
52
See Robert P. Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, 54
ANTITRUST L.J. 893, 913–14 (1985) (“The balancing process inherent in any [R]ule of
[R]eason analysis . . . at least as currently applied . . . produces a hopeless morass”).
53
Frank Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1984).
47
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the competitive significance of the restraints . . . .” How
does a court tell whether the arrangement promotes or
suppresses competition? It must consider the fact peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the
nature of the restraint and its effect, or actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
end sought to be achieved are all relevant facts. These
formulations are empty. Judges and justices rightly
protest that courts cannot make these judgments. “Courts
are of limited utility in examining difficult economic
problems . . . . [They are] ill–equipped and ill–suited for
such decision making [and cannot] analyze, interpret, and
evaluate the myriad of competing interests and the endless
data that would surely be brought to bear on such
decisions.”54
Moreover, the weighing process itself is fraught with peril. First,
Judge Easterbrook argues that “[i]t is pointless to weigh inter against intra–
brand competition because they are not commensurable.”55 Second, the
process is likely riddled with mistakes. As Justice Breyer, dissenting in
Leegin, observed: “One cannot fairly expect judges and juries (in resale
price maintenance cases) to apply complex economic criteria without
making a considerable number of mistakes.”56 Nowhere is this tendency
more apparent than in the Chicago Board of Trade case itself. As
discussed, Brandeis identified nine procompetitive benefits stemming
from the Call Rule. The problem with that analysis is that none of the
benefits cited bears any relation to the price–fixing feature of the Call
Rule. Put another way, all of these benefits could have been achieved
without the price restraint in question.
Even if courts were up to the task of weighing, the Rule of Reason as
articulated by Justice Brandeis is unwieldy.57 The breadth of the inquiry
outlined in Chicago Board of Trade opens up the litigation to all manner

54

Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
56
See Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 917 (2007)
(Breyer, J. dissenting).
57
See Easterbrook, supra note 53, at 12. (Noting that the Rule of Reason requires courts
to take into account numerous market facts and then weigh procompetitive benefits against
anticompetitive effects, while giving courts little guidance on how various factors should
be weighed).
55
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of evidence challenging or defending the restraints at issue.58 That, in turn,
generates costly pretrial discovery, as well as satellite litigation over
discovery disputes, heftier trial records and longer, more complicated
trials.59 All of these add significantly to the cost of antitrust litigation.
These added costs have a distributive effect favoring defendants, who have
deeper pockets and hence more financial staying power than plaintiffs.60
Moreover, the intensively fact–bound nature of the Rule of Reason
inquiry, particularly its emphasis on anticompetitive effects rather than
unlawful conduct, makes antitrust outcomes less predictable.61 Analysis
under the Rule of Reason is largely an ex post exercise. Parties will not
know if their conduct is illegal until after they engage in it.62 The Board
of Trade analysis does not provide the parties with a traffic signal that
would let them know that there will be consequences, even if no tangible
harm ensues.63 Lack of certainty not only makes litigation riskier, but also
makes business decisions more difficult. Lack of certainty in the business
community can have the ironic and wholly unintended effect of chilling
potentially procompetitive behavior by risk averse entities.
In short, Justice Brandeis’ formulation of the Rule of Reason is riddled
with holes. Its shortcomings have become more glaring as business
transactions have grown more complex, economic principles have become
better understood, and antitrust analysis has grown more sophisticated.
Yet, despite its deficiencies, Chicago Board of Trade has never been
explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court and is still cited by courts today
for its description of the Rule of Reason.64

B. Per se Rules
Not surprisingly, given the burdensome nature of the Rule of Reason
articulated in Chicago Board of Trade, courts began to look for shortcuts
in its application.65 Early on, courts, building on Judge Taft’s ruling in

58

Id. at 12. (Observing that judges are “ill–equipped and ill–suited” to “analyze,
interpret and evaluate the myriad of competing interests and the endless data that would
surely be brought to bear on such decision”). (citation omitted).
59
See Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 450.
60
Id.
61
Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1375, 1428–29 (2009).
62
Id. at 1426. (Because lack of anticompetitive intent is not a defense, a firm may be
held liable even though it could not have predicted the anticompetitive effect of its
conduct); see Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 450.
63
Cavanagh, supra note15, at 445.
64
See, e.g., American Needle, Inc., v, NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 203, n. 10 (2010).
65
See Meese, supra note 5, at 881 (“The indisputable costs of full–blown rule of reason
analysis understandably encourages courts, scholars, and enforcement officials to explore
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Addyston Pipe, came to realize that certain restraints were so pernicious
and so devoid of economic benefit that they can be adjudged and
condemned without the elaborate analysis called for in Chicago Board of
Trade.66 This insight, supported by both judicial experience and economic
theory, led to per se condemnation of certain restraints, including
horizontal price fixing67 and division of markets among competitors.68
Under the per se analysis, the plaintiff is spared the burden of defining
relevant markets and proving the defendant’s market power.69 Once the
court finds that the conduct at issue is within the per se category, that
conduct is “conclusively presumed to unreasonably restrain
competition.”70 Whereas the Rule of Reason is a rule of construction,71 the
per se rule is largely a rule of evidence72 that prohibits defendants from
offering evidence of procompetitive benefits for conduct that the courts
have determined is inherently anticompetitive.73 The per se approach
offers several benefits that the Chicago Board of Trade approach lacks,
including clarity, predictability, administrability, and efficiency.74 After
the Socony–Vacuum decision in 1940, per se rules became firmly
embedded in antitrust jurisprudence. Courts became enamored of the per
se approach in part because of the benefits described above but also
because of the widely held perception “that courts are of limited utility in
examining difficult economic problems”75 and therefore should not
“ramble through the wilds of economic theory.”76

alternative methods for evaluating the numerous restraints that avoid per se
condemnation.”).
66
See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1927); see also
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Unites States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1950) (“there are certain
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack
of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate injury as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for
their use.”).
67
Id.; see generally United States v. Socony–Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
68
See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 614 (1972).
69
See Northern Pacific Railway, 356 U.S. at 5.
70
Id.
71
Spencer Weber Waller, Understanding and Appreciating Competition Law, 61
ANTITRUST L.J. 55, 62 (1992).
72
Edward D. Cavanagh, Vertical Price Restraints After Leegin, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 1, 29 (2008).
73
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1927).
74
See Cavanagh, supra note 15, at 445.
75
Topco, 405 U.S. at 609.
76
Id. at 609–10, n. 10.
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C. Emergence of Quick Look
The Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Topco represents the high–
water mark of per se jurisprudence. Yet, even as courts looked to expand
the reach of per se rules in the 1960’s and early 1970’s, academic criticism
of per se analysis became widespread.77 Although there was virtual
unanimity in the antitrust community that price fixing among competitors
serves no legitimate economic purpose and should be condemned out of
hand, there was substantial disagreement as to whether per se rules were
appropriate beyond that narrow band of cases involving horizontal
agreement to fix prices or to divide territories. Critics questioned the
wisdom of applying per se rules to vertical restraints.78 The Supreme
Court’s 1967 decision in Schwinn,79 condemning as per se unlawful the
imposition of territorial restraints by a seller where the seller has parted
with title, domain, and risk, became a particular target of scholarly
venom.80 Schwinn, of course, was overruled a decade later by Sylvania,81
which held that vertically imposed territorial restraints should not be
condemned out of hand.82 Thirty years after Sylvania, the Supreme Court
in Leegin83 abnegated the per se rule with respect to vertically imposed
price restraints.84
Moreover, criticism of per se analysis was not confined to its
application to vertical restraints. As businesses grew more sophisticated
and transactions more complicated, courts began to see that the per se rule
could, in certain cases, be too blunt an instrument to use in analyzing
transactions involving horizontal restraints that may appear at first blush
to be anticompetitive but upon fuller analysis promoted, rather than
restrained, competition. Accordingly, courts began to take a more
circumspect and nuanced approach to horizontal restraints. BMI85 is a case
in point. There, CBS challenged the blanket licenses offered by BMI and
ASCAP under which users of copyrighted music would have access to the

77

Id. at 609, n. 10.
See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 280–85 (1993).
79
United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381 (1967).
80
See BORK, supra note 78, at 285 (“Antitrust is capable of sustaining meaningless
distinctions and state paradoxes but those of Schwinn were too many and too obvious to
persist for long. The precedent suffered a timely and deserved demise shortly after its tenth
anniversary.”).
81
Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
82
Id. at 49 (With respect to non–price vertical restraint, “the factfinder weighs all of the
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as
imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.”).
83
Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
84
Id. at 890.
85
Broadcast Music, Inc., v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
78
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entire BMI or ASCAP libraries for a single fee.86 The Second Circuit had
ruled that the blanket license was “literally” price fixing and should be
condemned out of hand.87 The Supreme Court rejected the per se analysis,
ruling that the blanket license was procompetitive because it (1) created a
new product; (2) increased rather than decreased output; (3) reduced
transactions costs; (4) enhanced consumer choice; and (5) was preferred
by consumers.88 In so ruling, the Court observed that “easy labels do not
always supply ready answers.”89 The Court remanded the case for a full
analysis under the Rule of Reason, but the Court clearly was of the view
that the blanket license would pass muster under that standard.90
Similarly, in National Society of Professional Engineers (“NSPE”)91
the Court was again hesitant to invoke per se condemnation of a horizontal
arrangement. At issue was an NSPE ethics rule that prohibited members
from discussing pricing on building projects “until after negotiations [had]
resulted in the initial selection of an engineer.”92 The government sued
alleging that the restrictions on competitive bidding suppressed price
competition among rivals.93 The NSPE defended, arguing that restraints
imposed by professional codes of ethics should not be summarily
condemned and that the restraints enhanced consumer welfare by
promoting safe structures.94
The Court rejected those arguments and ruled:
While this is not price fixing as such, no elaborate
industry analysis is required to demonstrate the
anticompetitive character of such an agreement. It
operates as an absolute ban in competitive bidding,
applying with equal force to both complicated and simple
projects and to both inexperienced and sophisticated
customers. As the District Court found, the ban “impedes
the ordinary give and take of the market place,” and
substantially deprives the customers of “the ability to
utilize and compare prices in selecting engineering

86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id. at 4.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 19–24.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 24–25.
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
Id. at 682–83.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 681, 684–88.
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services . . . .” On its face, this agreement restrains trade
within the meaning of §1 of the Sherman Act.95
In so holding, the Court considered—and rejected—NSPE defenses
and procompetitive justifications.96 NSPE marks a subtle shifting toward
more textured approach to per se illegality. Here, we have a case which,
while not classic price–fixing, is clearly anticompetitive in character. The
Court had no problem condemning the arrangement, but only after taking
into account possible justifications.97
BMI and NSPE laid the foundation for three subsequent Supreme
Court cases under section one of the Sherman Act: NCAA,98 Indiana
Federation of Dentists,99 and Cal Dental.100 In NCAA, plaintiffs, some
member schools with football programs, sued the NCAA, alleging that by
acting as the exclusive agent of member schools to negotiate with national
networks the right to televise college football games and by banning
member schools negotiating their own deals for televising their football
games, the NCAA violated section one of the Sherman Act.101 The
package negotiated by the NCAA provided for: (1) appearance
requirements under which at least 82 different schools would have
television exposure during the life of the contract; and (2) appearance
limitations, which restricted the number of times a given school could
appear over the three year term of the contract.102 Actual payments for
television rights per game would be negotiated with the member schools,
but the aggregate payment to all schools had to be at least $131.75 million
under the contract.103
The arrangement clearly restricted output and artificially inflated the
price for rights to televise college football games.104 Both the Southern
District of New York105 and Second Circuit106 condemned the NCAA
television policy as per se illegal. The Supreme Court agreed that the
NCAA conduct was unlawful but declined to apply the per se rule.107 In so
ruling, the Court identified three factors that did not underlie its decision
95
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to eschew per se analysis: (1) lack of experience with this type of restraint;
(2) the fact that the NCAA was a not–for–profit entity; and (3) respect for
the NCAA’s historic function of fostering amateurism in athletes.108
Rather, analogizing the NCAA to a professional sports league, the
Court held that some horizontal restraints among members were necessary
if the product—college athletics—were to exist at all; and therefore, per
se analysis was inappropriate in this case.109 That said, the Court wasted
little time in condemning the NCAA television plan. It concluded that the
NCAA plan “has a significant potential for anticompetitive effects”110 and
that the “anticompetitive consequences of this arrangement are
apparent.”111 The Court rejected out of hand the NCAA’s defense that it
lacked market power, ruling that “the absence of market power does not
justify a naked restraint on price or output.”112 The Court then cut to the
chase: “This naked restraint on price and output requires some competitive
justification even in the absence of a detailed market analysis.”113 The
Court went on to reject all of the NCAA’s proffered justifications and
affirmed the finding of liability.114
The Court took a similar approach in Indiana Federation of
Dentists.115 In that case, a group of dentists agreed not to comply with an
insurance company protocol that required dentists to submit dental
records, x–rays and treatment plans as a prerequisite to insurance company
approval of coverage for their patients.116 The FTC ruled this conduct
constituted an unlawful group boycott.117 The Seventh Circuit reversed,
holding that absent proof of a relevant market and market power, no
violation had been established.118
Reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court utilized that same
analytical framework that it had used in NSPE and NCAA.119 First, the
court found that defendants’ conduct did not fit the mold of a classic group
boycott that courts have traditionally condemned out of hand.120
Nevertheless, the Court found that by refusing to furnish the requested data
to insurance companies, defendants denied information to patients and
108
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“limited consumer choice by impairing the ordinary give and take of the
marketplace.”121 The Court further found that the FTC’s proof of
detrimental effects on competition obviated any need for a market
inquiry.122 Having found an adverse impact on competition, the court then
entertained and summarily rejected defendants’ proffered procompetitive
justifications.123
Thereafter, in Cal Dental, the court gave its blessing to the quick look
approach.124 The California Dental Association (“CDA”) was a non–profit
organization with some 19,000 member dentists.125 The CDA had a code
of ethics that prohibited false advertising with respect to price and quality
of service.126 The FTC contended that these restrictions in themselves were
not problematic but that as implemented, CDA barred any advertising of
discounts (even if truthful) and similarly any advertising with respect to
quality of services.127 The FTC concluded that the restrictions on price
advertising were per se unlawful and that, alternatively, restrictions on
both price advertising on non–price advertising would be unlawful under
a quick look analysis.128
The Ninth Circuit affirmed but rejected the application of the per se
rule and held the conduct in question unlawful under a quick look
analysis.129 The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Circuit Court.130 In
so ruling, the Court did give its seal of approval to the quick look analysis.
The Court for the first time acknowledged that the rulings in NCAA, IFD,
and NSPE “formed the basis for what has come to be called abbreviated
or ‘quick look’ analysis under the rule of reason.”131 The Court held that
the quick look approach applies where “an observer with even a
rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the
arrangement in question would have an anticompetitive effect on
customers and markets.”132
Moreover, the Court stated explicitly what it had hinted at in NSPE,
NCAA, and IFD: that there are no bright lines separating per se restraints
121
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from those requiring a more detailed analysis, stating that “[t]he truth is
that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are far less fixed
than terms like ‘per se’, ‘quick look’ and ‘[R]ule of [R]eason’ tend to make
them appear.”133 Accordingly, the Court proposed a sliding scale under
which “the quality of proof required should vary with the
circumstances.”134 Given that “there is generally no categorical line to be
drawn between restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference
of anticompetitive effect and those that call for a more detailed
treatment,”135 the Court must engage “in an enquiry meet for the case,
looking to the circumstances, details and logic of the restraint.”136
Having accepted the “quick look” concept in principle, the Court
ultimately concluded that a “less quick look” was essential in analyzing
CDA’s advertising restrictions and reversed the Ninth Circuit because (1)
the alleged anticompetitive effect on advertising was not intuitively
obvious and (2) the ban on misleading and unverifiable discount
advertising may have promoted, rather than restrained, competition.137
That said, the Court also emphasized that the fact that quick look is found
to be inapplicable does not necessarily mean that a full–blown Rule of
Reason analysis is required.138
Although Cal Dental provides some useful insights into the operation
of the Rule of Reason, particularly that the Rule of Reason operates on a
continuum without a sharp divide between per se and Rule of Reason and
that the quantum of proof should be proportional to the nature of the
conduct, the decision provides little guidance to the lower courts on how
quick look should be implemented. Moreover, the guidance that the court
does provide is not particularly useful. For example, as discussed above,
the Court states that quick look analysis is appropriate when the
anticompetitive nature of the conduct is obvious, even to a person with
little understanding of economics.139 Yet, the Court is silent on the
question of why the degree of economic analysis for a particular set of
facts should turn on what those with limited understanding of economics
perceive. For these reasons, Cal Dental must be viewed as a lost
opportunity for clarifying the application of the Rule of Reason generally
and quick look in particular.
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D. Do We Need Quick Look?
Support for the quick look protocol is widespread within the antitrust
world.140 Proponents of quick look view it as an improvement over
traditional Rule of Reason analysis for several reasons: (1) it reduces
litigation costs; (2) it fosters deterrence by encouraging lawsuits that might
otherwise be intimidated by the burdens of a traditional Rule of Reason
case; and (3) it achieves cost savings without barring defendants from
presenting justifications for their conduct.141 More importantly, the quick
look approach gives antitrust plaintiffs a fighting chance in cases that fall
outside the per se ambit. In effect, Rule of Reason equals Judgment for the
Defendant.142
Antitrust plaintiffs are at a severe disadvantage in traditional Rule of
Reason cases for a variety of reasons. First, they are generally outgunned
by deep pocket defendants who can afford to retain top law firms and
economic consultants and who can always find economic benefits in the
challenged conduct. Second, as discussed above,143 the Chicago Board of
Trade is indeterminate and provides little guidance to the courts. Third,
the courts have difficulty weighing procompetitive benefits against
anticompetitive effects.144 Fourth, in the face of this uncertainty, it is
difficult for courts to impose treble damages on defendants. In short, quick
look can serve to level the antitrust playing field without arbitrary
disadvantaging defendants.
Quick look, however, is not without its detractors. One critic has
described quick look as “all pain and no gain.”145 Critics also argue that a
quick look analysis adds significant costs to antitrust proceedings without
concomitant benefits.146 In particular, they argue that courts rarely invoke
140
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quick look so that cases are ultimately analyzed under a full Rule of
Reason that would apply were there no quick look in the first place.147
Further, where quick look is applied, the restraint would probably have
been condemned under a per se assessment, which is less costly than quick
look.148
However, critics of quick look also acknowledge that under the Rule
of Reason, antitrust defendants are nearly always successful in cases
falling outside of the per se spectrum.149 This fact alone is a strong reason
for the courts to develop a workable and robust quick look protocol that
would help level the antitrust playing field.

II. POST–CAL DENTAL RULINGS ON QUICK LOOK
A. Supreme Court
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not taken steps to fill the
analytical void left by Cal Dental in the nearly two decades since that
decision was handed down. Not once has the Court invoked quick look
post Cal Dental. In Dagher, the Court rejected quick look out of hand.150
In Leegin,151 the Court, reversing a century of precedent, held that resale
price maintenance should not be subject of per se condemnation152; rather,
vertically imposed price restraints must be evaluated under a full–blown
Rule of Reason.153 Thereafter, in Actavis,154 the Court declined to hold that
reverse payments made to settle patent infringement cases should be
viewed as presumptively unlawful, notwithstanding the anomaly that the
victim of the alleged infringement ends up compensating the alleged
infringer.155 The Court concluded that reverse payments failed to meet the
criterion for quick look set forth in Cal Dental
because the likelihood of a reverse payment bringing
about anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its
scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation
costs, its independence from other services for which it
might represent payment, and the lack of any other
147
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convincing justification. The existence and degree of any
anticompetitive consequence may also vary among
industries. These complexities lead us to conclude that the
FTC must prove its cases as in any other rule–of–reason
cases.156
Moreover, the Court post Cal Dental has sent mixed signals with
respect to quick look. For example, in Leegin, the Court seems to embrace
a dichotomous Rule of Reason/per se approach,157 stepping back from
language in Cal Dental that the Rule of Reason must be viewed as a
spectrum with “no categorical line to be drawn between restraints that give
rise to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and those
that call for a more detailed treatment.”158 At the same time, the Court in
Leegin also suggested that as trial courts gain experience with r/p/m cases,
the detailed analysis prescribed in Chicago Board of Trade may not be
necessary and that courts can “devise rules over time for offering proof, or
even presumptions, where justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and
efficient way to prohibit anticompetitive restraints and to promote
procompetitive ones.”159
Similarly, the Court in Actavis ruled that although reverse payment
arrangements should not be viewed as presumptively unlawful, a full–
blown Rule of Reason analysis may not be necessary, and that courts may
devise a structured Rule of Reason analysis.160 The court seems to say that
there may be a quick look or a not so quick look but nothing more.
Essentially, the Court has left the task of fleshing out the quick look
doctrine to the lower courts.161 While there is surely some wisdom in
allowing courts to develop experience with various types of restraints in
156
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order to determine which restraints are likely to have negative impact on
competition and which restraints require a detailed assessment before
anticompetitive effect can be measured, that approach also creates
uncertainty among litigants and adds significantly to the cost of litigation.
For example, in the wake of Cal Dental, antitrust plaintiffs must still be
prepared to present alternative theories of liability—per se, quick look and
Rule of Reason.162 Relying exclusively on a per se theory or a quick look
theory would be fatal were the court to conclude that a full blown Rule of
Reason analysis would be required.163 Yet, the higher costs incurred by the
preparation and the presentation of the alternative theories is precisely the
opposite result intended through use of quick look analysis.164 The
abbreviated Rule of Reason approach is intended as a shortcut to save time
and money rather than as an additional burden on antitrust litigants. Put
another way, the exigencies of developing a winning trial strategy may
defeat the purpose of quick look.

B. Lower Courts
As discussed,165 the Supreme Court in Actavis and Leegin left it to the
lower courts to shape the antitrust analysis in reverse payment and r/p/m
cases. In Dagher, the Court found the doctrine to be inappropriate.
However, in the nearly two decades since the decision in Cal Dental, lower
courts have made little progress in developing the parameters of quick
look. Indeed, the quick look doctrine appears to be in limbo.

1. FTC
One notable exception is the Three Tenors166 case in the D.C. Circuit.
In that case, the FTC challenged certain agreements between Polygram
and Warner as part of a joint venture to distribute an album recorded by
the Three Tenors in connection with their appearance at the 1998 World
162

See Stucke, supra note 61, at 1413 (“But the Court [in Cal Dental] never gave
guidance as to where along the continuum the lower courts should evaluate specific kinds
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factfinding if the court opts for a [Rule of Reason] analysis. Risk–averse counsel will
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standards, and hope that the trial court opts for the quick–look or per se standard in a
preliminary hearing. The necessity of a comprehensive trial strategy, however defeats the
purpose of the quick–look. And trial courts are likely to opt for [Rule of Reason] to lower
the risk of reversal because the lack guidance on the proper legal standard for particular
restraints.” (footnotes omitted)).
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Cup of Soccer.167 Warner had exclusive worldwide rights to the album.168
Warner chose to distribute the album only in the United States and licensed
the international rights to Polygram.169 The Three Tenors had previously
released albums in connection with the 1990 and 1994 World Cup
championships, both of which had been financial successes.170 At some
point after the joint venture had been established, the parties learned that
the repertoire for the 1998 concert would substantially overlap those of the
1990 and 1994 concerts.171 Thereafter, Polygram and Warner agreed, inter
alia, to suspend advertising and discounting of the earlier albums.172
The FTC challenged the agreed upon restraints under § 45 of the FTC
Act,173 relying on its earlier decision in In re Massachusetts Board of
Optometry,174 (“Mass. Board”). The FTC argued that the restraints in
question were “inherently suspect”, i.e., likely to restrict competition and
decrease output, and, absent proof of procompetitive justification, are
presumptively unlawful.175 Applying the Mass. Board truncated analysis,
the Commission concluded that the restraints in question were unlawful.176
Affirming, the D.C. Circuit not only embraced the analytical
framework in Mass. Board but also clarified its application, harmonizing
the Mass. Board approach with that taken in Cal Dental.177 The Court of
Appeals ruled that a restraint is presumptively unlawful “[i]f, based upon
economic learning and the experience of the market, it is obvious that the
restraint of trade likely impairs competition”.178 The Court further
explained that “the rebuttable presumption of illegality arises not
necessarily from anything ‘inherent’ in a business practice but from the
close family resemblance between the suspect practice and another
practice that already stands convicted in the court of consumer welfare.”179
Thus, “as economic learning and market experiences evolve, so too will
the class of restraints subject to summary adjudication.”180 The Court
concluded: “an agreement between joint venturers to restrain price cutting
and advertising with respect to products not part of the joint venture looks
167
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suspiciously like a naked price fixing agreement between competitors,
which would ordinarily be condemned as per se unlawful.”181
The D.C. Circuit further noted that the “Supreme Court has recognized
time and again that agreements restraining autonomy in pricing and
advertising impede the ‘ordinary give and take of the market place.’”182
Therefore, in the absence of any plausible explanations to the contrary, the
challenged restraints could be summarily condemned.
Thereafter, the FTC successfully invoked the “inherently suspect”
framework in North Texas Specialty Physicians v. F.T.C..183 In that case,
the North Texas Specialty Physicians (“NTSP”), an association of doctors,
negotiated fee arrangements with payors on behalf of the participating
doctors.184 Once the NTSP was in negotiation with a particular payor,
member doctors were barred under Physicians Participation Agreements
from separately negotiating their own deals with that payor.185 As a result,
the NTSP effectively eliminated price competition from any member
doctor willing to accept lower fees than those negotiated on behalf of the
group.186
The FTC argued that the collective action by the physicians
constituted a form of price fixing.187 The Administrative Law Judge found
that the conduct constituted horizontal price fixing and condemned it out
of hand, and the FTC affirmed.188 Although acknowledging that the
restraints might be “characterized as per se unlawful under the antitrust
laws and then subject to summary condemnation,” the FTC, relying on
Three Tenors, invoked its inherently suspect analysis.189 After considering
and rejecting the NTSP procompetitive justification arguments, the
Commission entered a cease and desist order against NTSP.190
The Fifth Circuit, like the FTC, chose not to decide whether the
arrangements in question were subject to per se condemnation but also
recognized that “some of the NTSP’s practices bear a very close
resemblance to horizontal price fixing.”191 In applying a truncated
analysis, the Court of Appeals underscored the heavy burden of proof on
the FTC to condemn NTSP after a quick look.
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To justify a quick look analysis, the burden remains on
the challenger to demonstrate that the proffered
procompetitive effect does not plausibly result in “a net
procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on
competition.” If, after examining the competing claims of
anti– and procompetitive effects, it remains plausible that
the net effect is procompetitive or that there is no effect
on competition, then “[t]he obvious anticompetitive effect
triggers abbreviated analysis has not been shown.”192
The Fifth Circuit found that the anticompetitive effects of the NTSP
practices at issue were “obvious” and that the “procompetitive
justifications do not plausibly result in a net procompetitive effect or in no
effect at all on competition” and concluded that the quick look approach
was appropriate on these facts.193
The FTC again invoked quick look on Realcomp II Ltd. v. F.T.C..194
In that case, the FTC challenged the practices of an association of real
estate brokers in Michigan which restrained competition among
brokers.195 Realcomp maintained a database of property listings but barred
information about exclusive agency and other nontraditional listings in the
database from being distributed to public real estate advertising websites
through its database feeds.196 The FTC alleged “that Realcomp’s website
policy and search function policy injured consumers by explicitly limiting
the publication and marketing of non–traditional listing, thereby
eliminating certain forms of competition without cognizable and plausible
efficiency justifications.”197 The Commission further argued that
“Realcomp had adopted restrictive policies in order to restrain competition
from limited service brokers.”198 The Administrative Law Judge dismissed
the complaint, but the Commission overruled that decision.199
In applying the quick look framework, the Commission found
Realcomp’s “restraints on discounters advertising and on the
dissemination of information to consumers regarding discounted
services”200 obviously anticompetitive by analogizing those restraints to
(1) music companies’ “restrictions on truthful and non–deceptive
192
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advertising”; (2) dentists refusal to provide insurance companies x–rays
from patients; (3) exclusion of a rival at a trade–show by marine dealers;
and (4) agreement among automobile retailers to limit the hours that
showrooms are open.201 The Commission’s use of analogy to establish
obviousness is a departure from the Three Tenors, which held that courts
must be guided by “economic learning and experience of the market.” 202
Critics have questioned whether, using analogy as the criteria, it is possible
to make a confident judgment about the principal tendency of the
restriction.203 Critics have also argued that the restraints in cases cited by
the Commission as analogous to Realcomp’s behavior were broader than
those in Realcomp and warned of the “slippery slope of argument by
analogy.”204
However, the Commission also ruled in the alternative that the
restraints at issue were unreasonable after undertaking a full Rule of
Reason analysis.205 The Court of Appeals affirmed on this ground and did
not pass on the Commission’s use of quick look.206
Despite these successes, the Commission has not always been
victorious in urging the quick look analytical framework. As discussed
above,207 in Actavis, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the FTC’s
arguments that reverse payments should be held presumptively unlawful
and subject to a quick look analysis. The setback in Actavis, however, has
not led the FTC to abandon quick look. In North Carolina State Board of
Dental Examiners v. F.T.C.,208 the FTC charged that the North Carolina
State Board of Dental Examiners had, through a series of administrative
procedures, effectively excluded non–dentists from the North Carolina
market for teeth whitening.209 The FTC held that the Board’s conduct was
unlawful under both a quick look and full Rule of Reason analysis.210 The
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Fourth Circuit affirmed,211 but the Supreme Court, affirming the Court of
Appeals, did not address the quick look issue.212
Currently, in Matter of 1–800 Contacts, Inc., the FTC has alleged that
1–800 Contacts and its rivals agreed to restrain price competition in search
advertising auctions.213 The FTC argues that the bid rigging agreements
constitute price restraints as well as advertising restraints and are
inherently suspect.214 Specifically, the FTC complaint alleges:
As horizontal agreements that restrain price competition
and restrain truthful and non–misleading advertising, the
Bidding Agreements are inherently suspect. Furthermore,
the Bidding Agreements are overboard: they exceed the
scope of any property right that 1–800 Contacts may have
in its trademarks, and they are not reasonably necessary
to achieve any procompetitive benefit. Less restrictive
alternatives are available to 1–800 Contacts to safeguard
any legitimate interest the company may have under
trademark law.215
This allegation may well move the notion of quick look well off its
moorings. In one paragraph, the Complaint conflates per se, quick look
and full–blown Rule of Reason concepts and seems inherently confused
about conduct that it asserts is inherently suspect.

2. Department of Justice
Despite promulgation of a structured Rule of Reason analysis that
parallels the FTC’s “inherently suspect” approach, during the Clinton
Administration,216 the Department of Justice has not actively advocated
quick look. The Justice Department did argue quick look in the Brown
University217 case decided six years prior to Cal Dental. The Justice
Department also alleged a quick look theory in the recent “no call” cases
involving Silicon Valley executives,218 but those cases have largely settled
without any further development of the quick look doctrine.
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3. Private Litigation
In the post–Cal Dental era, the lower courts have been quite reluctant
to invoke quick look in private antitrust litigation. Courts have declined to
engage in truncated analysis where (1) competitive effects are not
“obvious”219 or are “far from readily apparent”220; (2) the challenged
arrangement has “unique” features221; (3) the circumstances surrounding
the alleged restraint are “complex”222; and (4) the contours of the market
are not sufficiently well–known or defined to permit the court to ascertain
without the aid of extensive market analysis whether the challenged
practice impairs competition.223
This is not to suggest that the courts have never utilized quick look.
For example, in Teledoc v. Texas Medical Board, the district court held
that a Texas Medical Board requirement that a doctor must have face to
face interaction with a patient before prescribing drugs, thereby
prohibiting telephone consultations that result in prescribing drugs for the
patient, constitutes an unlawful restraint of trade.224
What accounts for the lower courts’ inertia with respect to quick look?
Part of the explanation surely lies in the lack of guidance from the Cal
Dental decision225 and the Supreme Court’s subsequent lukewarm attitude
to quick look expressed in Actavis and Leegin.226 Part of the explanation
may be in the growing hostility in the federal courts to private antitrust
actions.227 Neither explanation is complete because neither explanation
accounts for the success of the FTC in arguing for the quick look standard
219
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in the face of failure by private litigants. However, Edith Ramirez, former
FTC Chair, has offered an explanation for this anomaly.228 She argues that
“[a]s an expert body, the FTC is well positioned to advance antitrust
doctrine . . . .”229 Indeed “[w]e have often seen the FTC incorporate into
its decisions new ideas and modes of analysis that have yet to be accepted
widely by the courts.”230 Furthermore, appellate courts have accepted the
FTC’s quick look framework.231 Ramirez also observes that “[a]lthough
the courts of appeal in each of these [quick look] cases affirmed and
adopted the FTC’s analysis, federal district courts might well have been
reluctant to apply novel approaches had the courts ruled in the first
instance given their institutional preference for precedent.”232

III. PRESUMPTIVE LEGALITY?
The focus of the quick look framework has been to establish shortcuts
to finding antitrust liability. However, if we are to view conduct on a
spectrum, with one and representing per se liability, then, in theory, the
other end of the spectrum should represent per se legality or presumed
lawfulness. One perhaps unanticipated development emerging from the
quick look approach is that just as certain conduct can be summarily
condemned because it is obviously anticompetitive, so, too, certain
conduct can be summarily adjudged per se lawful because it is obviously
procompetitive. Indeed, the Supreme Court in American Needle
recognized the concept of presumptive legality, noting that where a certain
amount of cooperation among competitors is necessary for a product to
exist, the agreements among joint venture participants are “likely to
survive the Rule of Reason” and therefore do not need a “detailed
analysis.”233 Accordingly, the Rule of Reason “can . . . be applied in the
228
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twinkling of an eye” to find no liability.234 The American Needle approach
built on the Court’s earlier observation in NCAA that certain NCAA rules
may well be presumptively lawful:
It is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory
controls of the NCAA are . . . procompetitive because
they enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletes.
The specific restraints . . . that are challenged in this case
do not, however, fit into the same mold as do rules
defining the conditions of the contest, the eligibility of
participants, or the manner in which members of a joint
enterprise shall share the responsibilities and the benefits
of the total venture.235
The Seventh Circuit in Agnew v. NCAA,236 relying on American
Needle, construed the foregoing language “as a license to find certain
NCAA bylaws that ‘fit into the same mold’ as those discussed in Board of
Regents to be procompetitive ‘in the twinkling of an eye’ . . . that is, at the
motion to dismiss stage.”237 Ultimately, however, the Agnew court
declined to apply quick look because it concluded that the scholarship
regulations at issue did not “fit into the same mold” as the eligibility
regulations in NCAA and therefore required a more detailed examination
under the Rule of Reason.238
In addition, the Supreme Court’s decision in Twombly may encourage
a greater focus on the concept of presumptively reasonable. In Twombly,
the Court was clearly concerned that legitimate business behavior was
being attacked in private treble damage actions,239 thereby adding
significantly to the already high cost of antitrust litigation and creating a
significant problem of false positives.240 The Court then assigned the
district courts the task of gatekeepers to filter out unworthy cases at the
motion to dismiss stage to contain discovery costs and minimize any issue
of false positives.241 The concept of presumptive reasonableness, which
would force antitrust plaintiffs to come forward with strong evidence of
wrongdoing at the motion to dismiss stage, would facilitate the weeding
out process that Twombly demands.
234

Id. (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.39
(1984)).
235
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984).
236
683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).
237
Id. at 341 (citations omitted).
238
Id. at 343–44.
239
See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
240
See id. at 554, 558.
241
See id. at 559–60.

2017]

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

67

IV. CONCLUSION
In the two decades since the Cal Dental ruling, the decision stands as
a lost opportunity to provide a detailed framework for the quick look
concept. The lower courts have been reluctant to embrace quick look
analysis. Among plaintiffs, only the FTC has actively (and effectively)
advocated for the concept of presumptive illegality. Quick look languishes
in limbo. Ironically, the legacy of Cal Dental may turn out to be that it led
courts to develop rules of presumptive legality rather than presumptive
illegality.

